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EKSPROPRIASI KORPORAT DARI PERSPEKTIF PERSAINGAN 
PEMILIKAN DAN TADBIR URUS LEMBAGA PENGARAH DI MALAYSIA 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Tesis ini mengkaji kesan persaingan pemilikan dan tadbir urus lembaga 
pengarah terhadap eksproriasi korporat di Malaysia. Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk 
menyelidik samada kehadiran struktur pemegang saham pelbagai dan tadbir urus 
korporat memberi kesan yang kuat terhadap terhadap ekspropriasi korporat dalam 
kalangan syarikat tersenarai di Malaysia. Secara khususnya, kajian ini menjurus ke 
arah mengenalpasti kesan pemilikan satu pemegang saham kawalan dan tadbir urus 
lembaga pengarah terhadap ekspropriasi korporat, kesan pemilikan pemegang saham 
kawalan dan pemegang saham besar; dan tadbir urus korporat lembaga pengarah 
terhadap ekspropriasi korporat dan pemilikan pemegang saham besar sahaja dan tadbir 
urus lembaga pengarah terhadap ekspropriasi korporat. Dengan menggunakan regresi 
data panel, tesis ini menganalisa syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia 
dari tahun 2008 hingga tahun 2012. Hasil kajian ini merumuskan bahawa pemegang 
saham kawalan yang kuat mempunyai kawalan yang signifikan ke atas syarikat yang 
menjadikan mereka lebih dominan dalam membuat keputusan syarikat seterusnya 
meningkatkan pendedahan ke atas ekspropriasi korporat. Dapatan ini juga mendapati 
bahawa darjah pertama persaingan pemilikan tidak memberi kesan sebagai alat untuk 
mempengaruhi ekspropriasi korporat. Pada darjah kedua persaingan pemilikan, hasil 
kajian ini menunjukan bahawa kehadiran dua pemegang saham besar dapat menyaingi 
kuasa pemegang saham kawalan dan menghasilkan tekanan untuk mempengaruhi 
ekspropriasi korporat. Sementara, itu, pada darjah ketiga persaingan pemilikan, 
memberi kesimpulan bahawa kehadiran lima pemegang saham besar tidak berkesan 
 xvi 
 
untuk mengurangkan ekspropriasi korporat. Berkaitan dengan peranan lembaga tadbir 
urus; struktur lembaga pengarah, kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah dan imbuhan kepada 
lembaga pengarah, dapat disimpulkan bahawa saiz lembaga pengarah yang besar 
secara positifnya mempengaruhi ekspropriasi korporat dalam keadaan tiada 
persaingan pemilikan korporat (LSH). Disamping itu, peranan ahli lembaga pengarah 
bebas sebagai mekanisma tadbir urus dalaman tidak memberi kesan dalam kedua-dua 
keadaan samada tampa persaingan dan dengan wujudnya persaingan pemilikan 
korporat. Analisa dalam kepelbagaian lembaga mendapati bahawa ahli lembaga 
pengarah asing berfungsi sebagai mekanisma tadbir urus dalaman dalam kedua-dua 
keadaan samada tampa persaingan (LSH) dan dengan adanya persaingan pemilikan 
(CONT2 dan CONT3). Selain itu, kehadiran lembaga pengarah wanita tidak berfungsi 
sama sekali sebagai mekanisma tadbir urus dalam kedua-dua keadaan samada dalam 
keadaan tampa persaingan dan adanya persaingan pemilikan pemilikan korporat. 
Disamping itu, penemuan bertentangan antara kesan langsung dan kesan interaksi 
menghasilkan bukti yang tidak konklusif mengenai hubungan antara imbuhan kepada 
pengarah dan ekspropriasi korporat. Kesimpulannya, persaingan pemilikan dilihat 
berfungsi dengan berkesan sebagai alat untuk mengurangkan ekspropriasi oleh  
pemegang saham yang mengawal pada tahap tertentu iaitu pada darjah kedua 
persaingan pemilikan.  
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CORPORATE EXPROPRIATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
OWNERSHIP CONTESTABILITY AND BOARD GOVERNANCE IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the effect of ownership contestability and board 
governance on corporate expropriation in Malaysia. The objective of the study is to 
investigate whether the presence of multiple shareholders structure and board 
governance have significant impact on the corporate expropriation of Malaysian PLCs. 
Specifically, the study is directed towards identifying the effect of ownership of only 
controlling shareholder and board governance on corporate expropriation, the effect of 
ownership contestability between controlling shareholder and large shareholders; and 
board governance on corporate expropriation and the effect of ownership of only large 
shareholders and board governance on corporate expropriation. Using panel data 
regression, this thesis analysed listed firms in Bursa Malaysia from 2008 to 2012. The 
findings of this study infers that the powerful controlling shareholder who has 
significant control over the firm enables them to dominate the decision making process 
and hence increases firm’s vulnerability towards corporate expropriation. It is also 
found that the first degree of ownership contestability is ineffective to become a tool 
that influences the corporate expropriation. At the second degree of ownership 
contestability, this findings signify that the presence of two large shareholders could 
contest the power of controlling shareholder and produce more pressure to influence 
corporate expropriation. Meanwhile, at the third degree of ownership contestability, it 
infers that the presence of five large shareholders is ineffective in alleviating corporate 
expropriation. With regards to the role of board governance: board structure, board 
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diversity and board remuneration, it can be concluded that large board size is positively 
influenced corporate expropriation in the setting of non-contestability of corporate 
ownership (LSH). In addition, the role of independent director would not effective as 
internal governance mechanism in setting of both non-contestability and contestability 
of ownership structures. Analysis on board diversity indicates that foreign board 
members functions as internal governance mechanism in both situations of non-
contestability of corporate ownership (LSH) and contestability of corporate ownership 
(CONT2 and CONT3) structures. Moreover, presence of female board member does 
not work at all as an internal governance mechanism in the setting of both non-
contestability and contestability of corporate ownership structure. Furthermore, 
contradictory finding between direct effect and interaction term generates inconclusive 
evidence on the relationship between board remuneration and corporate expropriation. 
In conclusion, contestability of ownerships appears to function efficiently as a tool to 
alleviate expropriation by controlling shareholder under certain extent which is at 
second degree of ownership contestability.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Corporate governance is defined by Denis and McConnel (2003) as a set of 
mechanisms, involved in organization’s decision-making with the objectives to 
maximize the organization’s value and to increase shareholders’ wealth. Thus, every 
action and decision taken by the company is intended to provide benefits to all the 
shareholders of the company.  This is the same as that expressed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), where “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporation assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. In 
corporate finance, corporate governance is also a mechanism to protect the 
shareholders from expropriation of wealth by the controlling shareholders (Claessen, 
2006). This has motivated many corporate governance studies been carried out at firm 
level,  focusing on the role of multiple shareholders and boards of directors. This view 
is also supported by Llopis, Gonzales and Gasco (2007) who stated that corporate 
governance is related to standard compliance by a firm which includes  the relationship 
between the board of directors and the shareholders 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the collapse of WorldCom companies in 
the early 2000s have resulted in re-emergence of corporate governance issue. In the 
WorldCom companies’ debacle, several giant corporations such as Enron, Pharmalat 
and Tyco collapsed due to lack of corporate governance. Later, several other large 
corporations around the world were declared bankrupt. In 2008, the high profile 
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financial “supermarket” Lehman Brother Holdings collapsed as a result of weak 
corporate governance particularly on the part of the shareholders. After the Lehman 
Brother’s episode, many countries have taken further steps to strengthen their 
corporate governance systems (Mallin, 2007). In addition, international agencies such 
as the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, United Nation (UN) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
have enhanced and updated standards and practices of corporate governance to ensure 
that what happened in the past will not recur in the future.  
  Malaysia has taken several initiatives to strengthen its corporate governance 
system since 1996. It began when the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
introduced the directors Code of Ethics. This was followed by the establishment of 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in the year 2000 (MCCG 2000) in order to 
restore investors’ confident after Asian economic crisis in 1997. In addition, in 2001, 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement requires all listed companies to include a 
Corporate Governance Statement in their annual report. This is to ensure that all public 
listed companies comply with all the guidelines as required by the Bursa Malaysia. In 
addition, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established to further 
enhance corporate governance, where it serves to protect the interest of minority 
shareholders relating to their rights. Furthermore, MCCG was revised in 2007 and 
several amendments related to the board of directors have been made. Moreover, 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in the year 2000 (MCCG 2000) also issued 
a guideline in 2008 related to listing of companies on KLSE in order to have good 
corporate governance practices. This guideline is also linked with the board of 
directors in order to ensure the integrity and public accountability of public listed 
company’s directors.  In 2009, Securities Commission (SC) has introduced sections 
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317A and 320A of Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 (CMSA) to enhance 
corporate governance. According to The Reporter SC (2010), Section 317A empowers 
the SC to act against errant directors and officers of Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
for causing wrongful loss to the company. Section 320A, on the other hand, allows SC 
to act against anyone who influences the preparer and auditor of financial statements, 
causing them to be false and misleading. The Audit Oversight Board (AOB) has been 
introduced in 2010 to develop a robust audit oversight framework for Malaysian over 
PLCs. The recent new body, Securities Industry Dispute Resolution Center (SIDREC) 
has been set up by SC in early 2011. This new body will enhance investor protection 
by affording investors with small claims on settlement of disputes without the need to 
resort to expensive litigation (Tan Sri Zarinah Anwar, SC Chairman).  
MCCG 2012 was the first major deliverable of Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011 that focuses on strengthening board structure and composition recognizing the 
role of directors as active and responsible fiduciaries. The MCCG 2012 adopted a new 
structure which provides for greater clarity, more information to companies and allows 
for simpler reading. In essence, each principle in MCCG 2012 is followed by 
recommendation and commentaries. The recommendations are specific standards that 
contribute towards the principles. Every recommendation is followed by a certain 
commentary which seeks to explain and assist companies in understanding the 
recommendation. The MCCG 2012 has included some of the best practices from the 
MCCG 2007. 
Many of the corporate governance weaknesses that have resulted in companies’ 
failure are due to the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. This 
conflict, which arises because of separation of ownership and control leads to agency 
problem (Berle and Means, 1932).  As a result, the shareholders wealth maximization 
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objective cannot be achieved in the long run. This is further reinforced by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who stressed that agency problem will exist in a firm when the shares 
are not fully owned by the manager. However, the agency problem can arise not just 
between shareholders and managers, but also between controlling and minority 
shareholders, between shareholders and creditors and between controlling 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani, 2000; Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 
2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiffer and Vishny, 2000; Holderness, 2003).  
Grossman and Hart (1980), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) looked at monitoring 
role of large shareholders as a possible solution to agency problems that arises from 
the separation of ownership and control in public corporation. Gomes and Novaes 
(2005) and La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleiffer (1999) highlighted the importance 
of monitoring role played by large shareholders in the company. Interestingly, Gomes 
and Novaes (2005) introduced sharing control among large shareholders as a new 
corporate mechanism. According to Mitton (2002), large shareholders use their power 
and incentive to avoid expropriation by controlling shareholder. In addition, Zhong 
Gribbin and Zheng (2007) reveals that the effectiveness of monitoring by outside 
blockholders on managers have positive impact on firm’s earning. 
There are many factors that can affect corporate governance such as corporate 
ownership structure, economic, legal, social, political and cultural factors. In firm’s 
perspective, mechanisms of corporate governance can be seen in terms of internal and 
external mechanisms (Zulkafli, 2007). The internal control mechanisms are corporate 
ownership structure and board of directors while take over and market for corporate 
control and legal systems are external control mechanisms in the firm (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2004; Claessen, 2006). The key 
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determinants of corporate governance system are corporate ownership structure, 
composition and operations of the firms (Singam, 2003). It seems that corporate 
ownership structure and board of directors are the important mechanisms in 
influencing the internal corporate governance in the company as highlighted by Fama 
(1980), Jensen (1993), Shleifer and Visny (1997), Denis and McConnell (2003), 
Cremers et al. (2004) and Claessen (2006).  
Although numerous studies have been conducted to examine the various issues 
of ownership structure, hardly any of them focused on the impact of contestability and 
board governance on corporate expropriation. This is quite surprising considering the 
fact that ownership is a key mechanism in corporate governance. Malaysian PLCs have 
been identified as having high concentrated ownership structure (Claessens et al., 
1999; World Bank, 1998; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2000; Ishak and Napier, 
2004; Mohd Sehat and Abdul Rahman, 2005; Abdul Wahab and Abdul Rahman, 
2009). The existence of multiple shareholder structure (MSS) is due to the 
concentrated ownership structure where the firms controlled by single controlling 
shareholder accompanied by other large shareholders or firm controlled by several 
large shareholders. In firms with highly concentrated ownership structure, the 
controlling shareholders have significant power and incentive to expropriate corporate 
resources for their own benefit (Saez and gutieerez, 2015; Bennedson and Wolfenzon, 
2000; Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). The presence of several large 
shareholders and coalitions among large shareholders can be formed resulting in 
increased contestability by large shareholders in order to curb the power of controlling 
shareholder to expropriate fund for their own benefit. Therefore, this study is 
motivated by the issue of ownership structure focusing on contestability of large 
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shareholders and board governance that could have significant impact on expropriation 
issues in the firm.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The issues of expropriation by controlling shareholders and large shareholders 
have been debated extensively for example by Pagano and Roell (1998), Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon (2000), Gomes and Noveas (2001), Giterrez and Tribo (2003), Maury 
and Pajustee (2005), Attig, Guedhami and Mishra (2008) and Saez and Gutierrez 
(2015). This phenomenon occurs because normally, the party who holds a large 
amount of stock in the firm is the one who has significant control of the firm. The 
expropriation occurs when the controlling shareholders have both the ability and 
incentive to deflect fund for their own benefit (Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic, 2005). 
According to Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009), expropriation of wealth by 
controlling shareholders is one of the important manifestations of type II agency 
problem and the cost of expropriation has positive relationship with ownership 
structure (Krishnamurti et al, 2005).  
As indicated earlier, generally previous studies have found that Malaysian PLCs 
are dominated by controlling or large shareholders and they have highly concentrated 
ownership structure (Claessens et al., 1998; World Bank, 1998; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Abdul Samad 2002, Mohd Sehad and Abdul Rahman, 2005; Zuha Abdul Rahman and 
Mahenthiram, 2009). Almost one third of Malaysian PLCs is dominated by 
blockholders (Abdul Wahab, 2006), and approximately 56% of Malaysian PLCs’ 
shares are in the hands of blockholders (Mohd Sehat and Abdul Rahman, 2005). In 
addition, Ishak and Napier (2004) documented that controlling shareholder dominated 
around 66% to 97% of Malaysian PLCs in three different cut off points; 5%, 20% and 
50%. In addition, Classens et al. (2000) pointed out that roughly 41% of Malaysian 
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PLCs are held by single large shareholders. It is suggested that concentrated ownership 
increases the potential for the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by 
controlling shareholder. The high level of ownership concentration increases the 
propensity for expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders as 
mentioned by Shleifer, Andrei and Robert (1997). Malaysian PLCs are exposed to the 
risk of expropriation by controlling shareholder due to highly concentrated ownership 
structure. Therefore, based on the relevant evidence, the issue of expropriation by 
controlling shareholders is an important issue that needs to be addressed in Malaysia 
particularly with respect to the contestability of large shareholders against the 
controlling shareholder in the firm. This party is commonly known as the controlling 
shareholders and it also has considerable control on firm’s policies (Loh and Mat Zin, 
2007). Controlling shareholder has substantial significant discretionary power on key 
strategic decisions, which provide a crucial baseline for possibility of expropriation. 
Controlling shareholder will ensure that the management will serve on their behalf, 
hence actions and policies made by the management would lead to their interest 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). As Malaysia is classified as having high concentrated 
ownership with the presence of controlling shareholder, it is interesting to infer how 
severe the problem of expropriation is by the controlling shareholders in this country. 
The presence of large shareholders and the role played by them is very important 
in order to minimize the vulnerability of expropriation. Large shareholders use their 
power and incentive to avoid possibility of expropriation by controlling shareholder 
that benefit to other shareholders (Mitton, 2002; Attig et al., 2009; Gomes, 2000). 
Previous works have documented that the presence of large shareholders in the firm 
implies the existence of contestability among large shareholders including controlling 
shareholder to gain control in the firm and this will benefit other shareholders (Pagano 
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and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2000; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005; Gomes and Noveas, 2005). In addition, the presence of more than one 
large shareholder will enhance the value of the firm (Pagano and Roell, 1998; 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 
2008), significantly reduce agency cost (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2009) and reduce the 
corporate expropriation (Maury and Pajustee, 2002; Giterrez and Tribo, 2003; Maury 
and Pajustee, 2005; Attig et al., 2008). 
 The monitoring role is very important task that should be carried out by large 
shareholders and it will be a viable solution to agency problem (Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The existence of more than one large shareholder 
and the contestability against controlling shareholders in order to gain control will 
lessen the possibility of expropriation. Empirical evidence have validated that 
contestability among large shareholders will benefit other shareholders (Zwieble, 
1995; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes and Noveas, 
2000; Bloch and Hege, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Therefore the role of large 
shareholders is very important to ensure that the action taken by the firm will not only 
benefit the controlling shareholder (Attig et al., 2008; Ramli, 2010; Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997). They have a right to monitor the 
controlling shareholders to ensure that every action taken will also provide benefits to 
all shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Pagano and 
Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes, 2000). Therefore, this study 
will investigate the issues of ownership structure focusing on contestability of large 
shareholders that could have significant impact on corporate expropriation. 
Furthermore, this study also includes the effect of board governance on the 
corporate expropriation. This is vital due to the linkage between shareholders and 
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directors since the board of directors is elected by the shareholders. Notably, the board 
of directors is the highest governing authority in the management structure of a public 
listed company. Board of directors plays an important role to lead the company and to 
ensure that its main responsibility is well executed. Previous studies on board of 
directors focused on their impact to the performance of the firm (Adam and Mehran, 
2005; Elsayed, 2007; Ponnu, 2008; Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff, 2009; Belkhir, 2009) 
but limited studies focused on the policies of the firm (Saad, 2010; Heng, Azrbaijani 
and San, 2012). 
According to Bethel et al. (1998) the motive of the investors who purchased large 
block of shares is to control the firm so that they can influence firm’s policies. In this 
respect, Croqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) stated that shareholders can influence 
corporate policies directly by appointing directors who can represent them in the board 
of directors.  A strong board of directors can play a monitoring role by ensuring that 
the management does not take any action that can negatively affect shareholder’s 
wealth (Howton, Howton and Olson, 2001). This will also ensure that the investors’ 
assets are protected as well as minimize the vulnerability of corporate expropriation, 
hence all shareholders will get appropriate returns and investors’ confidence will 
increase.  
Most of the previous studies on board of directors are directed towards 
understanding the influence of its structure and its relationship with firm’s 
performance. This study is designed in a similar framework but specifically intended 
to examine its relationship with the corporate expropriation. Thus, this study suggests 
that boards should be structured according to corporate governance best practices 
recommendations. For example, at least one third of the board should consist of 
independent directors in order to obtain independence and professionalism. Therefore, 
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the independent directors’ presence in the board is important to ensure that any action 
or decision taken is not dominated by the directors representing the controlling 
shareholders. Hence, the role of the board is to reduce the potential agency problem 
and the vulnerability of corporate expropriation through monitoring, representation 
and oversight responsibilities. Thus, this study intends to investigate whether the board 
structure, board diversity and board remuneration will have significant impact to 
minimize the vulnerability of expropriation.  
Expropriation can be defined as illegal removal of asset, wealth and profit by 
controlling shareholders using their power of control in the firm at the expense of other 
shareholders for their own benefit (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Singhai, 2002; Sulong 
and Mat Nor, 2008). Basically, there are various forms of expropriation such as profit 
expropriation, tunneling of assets and improper dilution of ownership (Singhai, 2002), 
related party transaction (Harto, 2012) and inefficient investment by concentrated 
ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sulong and Mat Nor, 2008). This 
study intends to use profit expropriation through dividend payout as a proxy for 
expropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders to address the issue of agency 
problem and catering theory of dividend. Dividends are used as a proxy because there 
is no consensus regarding the best proxy to measure the expropriation by controlling 
shareholder depicted in agency problem (Banchit and Locke, 2010). In addition, 
dividend payout is one of the most crucial conflicts of interest between management 
and shareholders as explained by free cash flow problem and agency problem (Jensen, 
1986). Previous studies also proposed that dividends can alleviate the free cash flow 
problem and agency problem in the firms. Dividends are also seen as an important 
component of investment return to the shareholders.  
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Dividends have been demonstrated in past studies as providing evidence of how 
controlling shareholders expropriate firm’s wealth at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders will prefer to keep earnings within the 
company and pay lower dividend in order to ensure that they have easy access to 
expropriate for their own private benefit (La Porta et al., 2000; Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson, 2006; Saez and Gutierrez, 2015). Tunneling activities by controlling 
shareholder such as self-dealing transaction occurs at the expense of minority 
shareholder (Bae, Kang & Kim, 2002) and will result in lower dividend payout. 
Classen et al. (2000) argued that controlling shareholders will extract profit for their 
private benefit and transferring profit to their affiliate companies by paying low or no 
dividend to shareholders. Past studies also documented that highly concentrated 
ownership, low dividend payments and lower firm valuation is a result of expropriation 
by controlling shareholder (Classen et al., 2000; Facio and Lang, 2001; La Porta et al., 
2002). 
According to the literature, Malaysian PLCs have highly concentrated ownership 
structure with the presence of controlling shareholder. As this could expose to the high 
risk of expropriation, it provides a motivation to conduct expropriation research on 
Malaysian PLCs. This study investigates the effects of contestability of large 
shareholders against controlling shareholder and the board governance in Malaysian 
PLCs and their impact on corporate expropriation measured by dividend payout.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The earlier section indicates the role of ownership relating to corporate expropriation. 
Based on the discussion in the problem statement earlier, the following research 
questions are developed for this study. 
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a. Does the presence of only controlling shareholder has significant impact on 
corporate expropriation?  
b. Does the presence of large shareholders have significant impact on corporate 
expropriation? 
c. Does board structure have significant impact on corporate expropriation?  
d. Does board diversity have significant impact on corporate expropriation?  
e. Does board remuneration have significant impact on corporate expropriation?  
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether the presence of MSS and the 
board governance will have significant impact on the corporate expropriation of 
Malaysian PLCs. This broad objective can be achieved through the following specific 
objectives of the study: 
a. To investigate whether the presence of only controlling shareholder influences 
corporate expropriation.  
b. To examine whether the presence of large shareholders influences corporate 
expropriation.  
c. To identify the relationship between board structure and corporate 
expropriation.  
d. To examine the relationship between board diversity and corporate 
expropriation.  
e. To investigate the relationship between board remuneration and corporate 
expropriation.  
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1.5 Scope of Study 
This research attempts to investigate the impact of ownership structure focusing on 
contestability of large shareholders and board governance on corporate expropriation 
of a firm. Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs) are selected as the sample in the 
study due to the availability of the relevant data. The period of the study is from 2008 
to 2012 because of amendments of MCCG (revised 2007) to further strengthen 
corporate governance practice especially pertaining to the appointment of independent 
directors. Furthermore, due to more than 400 firms will be available in the sample, the 
5-year period is considered adequate.   
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study is expected to provide a better understanding on the corporate governance 
mechanism especially on ownership structure and board governance by focusing on 
contestability and board of directors that served as the important internal mechanisms 
in corporate governance. This study will offer insights on how ownership structure and 
the board of directors play an important role in influencing the expropriation of the 
firm. Ownership structure and board of directors are crucial in providing guidelines 
and information to potential investors, researchers, regulators as well as policy makers 
such as Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission. 
As mentioned in earlier sections, many large firms collapsed due to weaknesses 
of corporate governance especially regarding the internal mechanisms. Therefore, this 
study focuses on the investigation of the impact of contestability of large shareholders 
against controlling shareholder and board governance on expropriation in the firm. It 
analyzes the role and the existence of large shareholders and the board governance in 
influencing the expropriation in the company. The findings of this study will enhance 
the understanding of the role played by large shareholders and controlling shareholder. 
14 
 
Unlike many previous studies which normally focus on the type of the ownership 
structure, this study considers the contestability of large shareholders against 
controlling shareholder in order to gain control in the firm. In addition, the role played 
by board governance variables can further enhance the understanding of expropriation 
of the company which is not influenced by certain groups of shareholders (controlling 
shareholder).  
By focusing on the contestability large shareholders against controlling 
shareholder in Malaysia, this study extent the current literature on the role played by 
different groups of shareholders in highly concentrated ownership structure from the 
perspective of MSS.  Furthermore, it further enriches the literature on agency theory, 
specifically when the ownership structure is highly concentrated. From the theoretical 
perspective, the findings of this study are expected to provide further explanations on 
the agency problems between controlling shareholders and other large shareholders. 
The research framework in this study offers a combination of two internal mechanisms 
in corporate governance which is developed based on the ownership structure and 
board governance in explaining corporate expropriation. Moreover, this study also 
provides additional evidence on agency problems based on contestability in order to 
gain control in the firm which includes firm with controlling shareholders and firm 
without controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, the findings of this study add value to Bursa Malaysia and Securities 
Commission as a guideline in designing a proper governance mechanism.   
 
1.7 Organization of The Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This chapter describes the background of 
the studies, problem statement, research questions, research objectives and definition 
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of keys term. The second chapter is a special chapter describing the corporate 
ownership structure of Malaysian PLC’s. In this chapter, it introduces the equity 
market, corporate ownership structure including their composition and also existence 
of MSS, corporate expropriation and the development of corporate governance in 
Malaysia. Chapter three provides a review on previous work pertaining to this research 
in order to shape the framework of this study. In chapter four, hypotheses to be tested 
are formulated based on the literature reviewand the research framework of the study. 
Chapter five reports the main empirical findings and the analysis of the findings. 
Chapter six provides detailed discussion on the empirical findings of the study. 
Chapter seven discusses the conclusion, implication of the study and limitation of the 
study as well as provides suggestions and recommendations for future research. 
 
1.8 Definition of Key Terms 
There are several key terms used in this study that require understanding in terms of 
definition, meaning and concept. The commonly used terms are as follows:  
 Multiple Shareholder Structure (MSS) 
Multiple shareholder structure refers to the concentrated ownership structure in 
which shares are held by a group or a few large shareholders who control the 
company. This means that the ownership structure owned by the largest 
shareholders accompanied by other large shareholders or a few large 
shareholders.  
 Blockholders/large shareholders 
Blockholders or a large shareholder refers to the individual or institutions who 
owned 5% or more of direct and indirect ownership shares of total outstanding 
shares.  
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 Single Controlling Shareholders (SCS) 
A single controlling shareholder refers to the individual or institution which 
holds a sizable amount of shares in a company. Specifically, it refers to the 
largest shareholder in the firm who owns more than 33% of outstanding shares. 
In effect, those who own more than 33% shares are allowed to have significant 
influence on corporate decisions in the company. This is applicable to companies 
with one controlling shareholder (at least or greater than 33%) and with no large 
shareholders (at least or greater than 5% but less than 33%). This is based on the 
threshold issued by Securities Commission where the shareholders who hold at 
least 33% of outstanding shares will have adequate controlling right on the 
management or to control the composition of a majority of the board of directors 
of such company (Bursa Malaysia). Largest shareholder or group of large 
shareholders who owns a minimum of 33% could have significant influence on 
corporate decisions. 
 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to a system that controlled and directed for a 
company in broader perspective which will require a good relationship of all 
stakeholders in managing a company successfully. It is an internal control 
mechanism system that influences management behavior to guarantee a high 
value of the owners’ equity in the firm. 
 Corporate expropriation 
Corporate expropriation can be defined as illegal behavior of controlling 
shareholders or management who misuse their power of control in the firm to 
transfer company assets and profit to themselves at the expense of other 
shareholders. Thus, expropriation tends to occur when the controlling 
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shareholder has both the ability and incentive to generate private benefit at the 
expense of other shareholders. 
 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structures identify who is the shareholder and who are the 
controlling shareholders that control the firm and it can either be dispersed or 
concentrated. Dispersed ownership structure exists when the firm is owned by 
a lot of shareholders while concentrated ownership structure occurs when 
majority of the shares are owned by several large shareholders. 
 Board Governance 
Board governance is related to the  board of directors such as board structure, 
board diversity and board remuneration. 
 Board Structure 
In general, board structure refers to three characteristics of board of directors 
which ares board size, board composition and board leadership. These 
characteristics are used to capture the monitoring ability of the board and 
determine the effectiveness of its governing duties. 
 Board Diversity 
In general, diversity can be defined as all aspects of demographic 
characteristics, backgrounds and experiences. Some corporations describe 
diversity as differences of viewpoint, professional experiences, education, 
skills and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board 
heterogeneity, whereas some corporations view it as a concept of race, gender 
and national origin.   
 Board Remuneration 
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Board remuneration refer to the rewards to the board of directors which include 
fee, salary, bonus and benefits in-kind. The remuneration package includes the 
fee for non-executive directors and the total package for executive directors. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE EXPROPRIATION IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
This chapter discusses the corporate ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms of Malaysian PLCs. The first section provides the overview of the 
Malaysian equity market. The second section introduces the corporate ownership 
structure in Malaysia by providing an overview of ownership concentration, 
composition and two distinct types of corporate ownership structure. The third section 
focuses on multiple shareholder structure. The fourth section discusses the issues of 
corporate expropriation in Malaysia. The fifth section discusses the corporate 
governance mechanism related to ownership and the sixth section discusses the 
dividend policy in Malaysia. The final section provides the summary of the chapter. 
 
2.1 Overview of the Malaysian Equity Market  
The capital market consists of equity market, private and public debt securities market 
and financial derivatives market. Among the participants in the market are investors, 
issuers and market institutions. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was 
established on December 14, 1976 after the termination arrangement of currency 
between Malaysia and Singapore. KLSE changed its name to Bursa Malaysia on April 
14, 2004 in order to be more customer-driven and market-oriented as a respond to 
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global changes and to enhance competitiveness. The Capital Market Master Plan was 
launched by Securities Commision in October 1999 to strengthen and to provide 
direction for the Malaysian capital market for the next ten years. It also seeks to ensure 
that the Malaysian capital market is able to meet future challenges successfully.  
Bursa Malaysia is one of the largest bourses in Southeast Asia that offers a 
variety of investment alternatives to investors.  Initially, Bursa Malaysia board 
structure consists of the Main Board, the second Board and the MESDAQ market. The 
Main Board comprised of established and large companies, the Second Board is for 
relatively smaller companies while the MESDAQ Market is for the high growth and 
technology companies. The Second Board and the MESDAQ Market were established 
as a starting point for relatively small companies to access capital to raise fund for their 
future expansion.  Companies listed on the Second Board or the MESDAQ can be 
transferred to the Main Board when it meets listing criteria established for listing on 
the Main Board.   
However, beginning 3rd September, 2009 Bursa Malaysia and the Securities 
Commission implemented a new framework for listing and equity fund raising which 
is considered as the one of the major changes to the capital market. Bursa Malaysia 
introduced a new board structure to the investors and issuers which only results in two 
markets instead of three markets previously. The new structure consists of the Main 
Market which combined both the Main Board and the Second Board while the ACE 
Market replaced the MESDAQ Market. The Main Market comprised of established 
companies in terms of their track record and size. Table 2.1 shows the key changes of 
the entry requirements in the Main Market. In contrast, the ACE Market serves as an 
alternative market for companies from all businesses and economic sectors. The new 
restructuring of Bursa Malaysia was designed so that the investors can have efficient 
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access to the capital market. This restructuring is also expected to make Bursa 
Malaysia a more attractive platform for both local and foreign companies, and to make 
Malaysia more competitive internationally.  
 
Table 2.1 
Key Amendments to Entry Requirements 
Source: Securities Commission 
 
Listing route Previously Now (Main Market) 
Profit test  Main Board 
- Aggregate after-tax profit 
of RM 30mil over 3-5 
financial years (FYs), with 
at least RM8mil after-tax 
for the latest FY 
 
 Second Board 
- Aggregate after-tax profit 
of RM12mil over 3-5 FYs, 
with at least RM4mil for 
the latest FY 
 Aggregate after-tax 
profit of RM20mil over 
3-5FYs, with at least 
RM6mil after-tax profit 
for latest FY 
Market 
capitalization 
test 
 Market capitalization of at 
least RM500mil and at 
least RM30mil after-tax 
profit for the latest FY; and 
 Operating history of at least 
3FYs in the same core 
business 
 Market capitalization 
of at least RM500 mill 
remains but no profit 
requirement for the 
latest FY 
 Only need to have a 
minimum of 1 FY 
operating revenue 
Infrastructure 
project 
corporation 
(IPC) 
 Project cost of at least 
RM500mil with remaining 
concession/license period 
of at least 15 years 
 Minimum project cost 
of RM500mil remains 
but the Securities 
Commission (SC) may 
consider a listing 
proposal with a shorter 
remaining 
concession/license 
period for IPCs that 
fulfill the profit test 
Note: under the SC new Equity Guideline, there will no longer be any requirement on minimum issued and 
paid-up capital 
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The Main Market consists of 860 listed companies, while the ACE Market 
contains 117 listed companies. Currently there are 14 industries under the Main Market 
as list shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Numbers of Malaysian PLCs by Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Star 2011 
As shown in Table 2.2, most of the companies are listed under the five main 
industries which is equivalent to 78% of the total numbers of listed companies. The 
five main industries comprise of industrial product (30.5%), trading/services (20.7%), 
properties (10.2%) consumer products (16.4%) and construction (5.5%). Other 
industries only accounted less than 5% each to the overall number of listed companies.  
 
Industry Number of Companies Percentage 
Industrial Products 262 30.5 
Trading / Services 178 20.7 
Properties 88 10.2 
Consumer Products 141 16.4 
Constructions 47 5.5 
Finance 38 4.4 
Plantations 41 4.8 
Technology 32 3.7 
Reits 14 1.6 
Infrastructure 7 0.8 
Hotels 5 0.6 
Exchange Traded Fund 5 0.6 
Mining 1 0.1 
Closed-End Fund 1 0.1 
Total 860 100 
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Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of ownership in Malaysian PLCs among local 
investors and foreign investors from 2011 until 31 December, 2015 (Bursa Malaysia 
Annual Report 2015). The highest ownership of foreign investor is recorded in 2012, 
2013 and 2014 with shareholding of 24%. The local investors still dominate the 
ownership of PLCs in Bursa Malaysia with an average shareholding of 77%.  
 
Figure 2.1 
Distribution of Share Ownership of Malaysian PLCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Annual Report 2015 
 
2.2 Corporate Ownership Structure of PLC 
Ownership structure is one of the important mechanisms in corporate governance. 
Corporate governance arises because of the separation of ownership (shareholders) 
and control (decision maker) in a firm. The composition of ownership structure will 
determine who control the firm or who the ultimate shareholders are. Controlling 
shareholders can be defined as a person or a group of persons who together is entitled 
to exercise or control the exercise of at least 33% of the voting right shares in a 
company or who in a position to control the composition of a majority of the board of 
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directors of such company (Securities Commission Malaysia, Equity Guideline 
August 2009).  In addition, according to Bursa Malaysia Main Market Listing 
shareholding spread (Bursa Malaysia, 2009), PLCs should ensure that at least 25% of 
their outstanding share or  a minimum number of 1,000 shareholders must be owned 
by public shareholders with not less than 100 shares each.  
 
2.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
In general, Malaysian PLCs are classified as having concentrated ownership 
structure (Claessens et al., 1998; Claessens et al., 2000 and World Bank, 1998). 
According to World Bank (1998) small groups and related parties dominated majority 
of the shares in the PLCs and 85% had owner-managers. It was reported that on 
average, five largest shareholders owned 60.4% of outstanding shares and more than 
half of voting shares. In addition, 37.4% of the companies have one dominant 
shareholder, 67.2% of the shares are controlled by family ownership and 13.4% of the 
shares are in the hand of the state. A study by ADB s (2000) reveals that the largest 
shareholders control 30.3% of the shares, while the top five largest shareholders 
control 58.8% and the top 20 shareholders control 80% of all Malaysian PLCs as of 
the end of 1998.   
Claessens et al. (2000) analyzes 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries 
and found that most of the companies are controlled by single owner.  Out of the total 
66 Malaysian PLCs in the sample, they found that 41 companies belong to family 
groups. This shows that ownership structure in Malaysia is highly concentrated and 
therefore consistent with the study by Abdul Samad (2002), which has a total sample 
of 731 companies and found that ownership of Malaysian PLCs is controlled by a few 
